State of Connecticut Child Fatality Review Panel’s
Investigation into the Death of Andrew M.
released: May 7,1998

http://ct.gov/oca/lib/oca/andrew_m.doc

State of Connecticut Child Fatality Review Panel’s
Investigation into the Death of Andrew M.
released: May 7,1998

Part I:  The Immediate Circumstances
 

Child Fatality Review Panel Members

Linda Pearce Prestley, Esq., Chairperson Child Advocate
John Bailey, Esq. Chief State's Attorney
Chief Leroy Bangham Farmington Police Department
H. Wayne Carver II, M.D.  Chief Medical Examiner
Gary Fitzherbert Executive Director  The Glenholme School
Leticia Lacomba, M.S.W. Regional Administrator  Department of Children and Families
Betty S. Spivack, M.D. Pediatrician

Consultants:

Suzanne M. Sgroi, M.D. Executive Director  New England Clinical Associates
Michael A. Nunno, D.S.W. Senior Extension Associate
Martha J. Holden, M.S. Senior Extension Associate  Family Life Development Center
College of Human Ecology, Cornell University

Office of the Child Advocate Staff:

Barbara J. Claire, Esq. Associate Child Advocate
Denise L. Scruggs Administrative Assistant

·         Under no circumstances, should the physical restraint of a child include compression of the child’s thorax by the weight of an adult.

·         Staff response at the Facility in which Andrew died reflected an inadequate behavior management program.

·         The Facility utilized an outdated physical restraint training program that did not conform to currently-accepted standards established by contemporary training programs.

·         Although not necessarily a contributing factor to Andrew’s death, the Facility’s staff response to this medical emergency was inadequate.

·         Although not a contributing factor to Andrew’s death, the treatment plan at the Facility lacked sufficient direction regarding the use of physical restraints on medically compromised children.

·         The Department of Children and Families should have conducted an assessment of behavior management programs and physical restraint policies affecting children under DCF’s care, after the death of Robert R.

·         The Department of Children and Families should promulgate regulations and policies that address the development of appropriate physical restraint policies for use in the facilities that they license and in the facilities in which children who are under the care and custody of DCF are placed.

·         The Department of Public Health should promulgate regulations designed to develop standards for behavior management programs and physical restraint policies in the children’s facilities that they license.

·         Neither the Facility nor the Department of Children and Families ensured that Andrew was advised of his right to a hearing and his right to an attorney upon involuntary admission to a psychiatric facility.

Table of Contents


 

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes sections 46a-13l (b) and (c), the Connecticut Child Fatality Review Panel is mandated to review the circumstances of the death of a child who has received services from a state department or agency addressing child welfare, social or human services or juvenile justice. After a preliminary examination of the facts in this case, the Child Advocate, in her role as Chairperson of the Panel, convened a Fatality Review Panel meeting on March 26, 1998 to review the circumstances surrounding the death of Andrew M., a child who was legally committed to the care and custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) when he died at the "Facility" on March 22, 1998.

The purpose of this review is twofold: In Part I, the Panel seeks to identify the immediate circumstances surrounding, and particularly to isolate those factors playing the most prominent role in, the death of this child, with apposite recommendations. In Part II, the Panel assesses the less immediate circumstances surrounding the death of this child, such as the predicates for state involvement in Andrew’s case, the services and interventions provided, and the social work and therapeutic management of his case, and again provides relevant recommendations. Not only does this review of the broader circumstances put the first tier of inquiry into context, but also facilitates a better understanding of how this child might have been better served and protected by the system as a whole.

Part I includes an examination of the events which led up to the untimely death of this child; the institution’s policies and procedures on behavior management, including the use of therapeutic holds; and the clinical responses to this incident. It also addresses the role of state agencies in the protection of children in care in mental health and other facilities across the state. Part II, which will be released by the Fatality Review Panel on or before June 22, 1998, will include a consideration of the issues raised by Andrew's social, psychological and medical history; his history with DCF, Connecticut's child protection agency; and the efficacy of the therapeutic and medical management of his case.

In conducting its review of the above-described matters, Panel members took the sworn testimony of a number of witnesses (psychiatric facility employees, DCF employees, a medical doctor and an employee of a private social services provider), and invited them to provide information and their own recommendations for the Panel's consideration. Additionally, Panel members reviewed: all records and documents pertinent to this case, including the child protection records of Andrew M., his mother, and his siblings provided by the DCF; records provided by the Department of Public Health (DPH) pertaining to the "Facility;" Department of Social Services (DSS) records; Judicial Department court records regarding Andrew M. and his siblings; extensive inpatient and outpatient records of Andrew M. and his siblings provided by a number of hospitals and medical doctors; records from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner; police reports and statements pertaining to the death of Andrew M.; records provided by numerous social service provider agencies regarding Andrew and members of his immediate family; and finally, the educational records of Andrew M. Additionally, Panel members interviewed Andrew’s court-appointed counsel by telephone, and made an on-site visit to the Facility as well. The Panel also requested and received extensive records from shelters, group homes, residential facilities, detention centers, and hospitals throughout the state on the policies and procedures pertaining to the issue of physical restraint of children in those facilities.

In the course of its investigation, the Panel retained the services of Suzanne Sgroi, M.D., the Executive Director of New England Clinical Associates, for her expertise in residential reviews and physical restraints; and Michael Nunno, D.S.W. and Martha J. Holden, M.S., Senior Extension Associates at the Family Life Development Center, School of Human Ecology, Cornell University, who are experts in therapeutic physical restraints and training techniques. Their combined expertise and experience have been invaluable in assisting the Panel members to understand the theoretical, practical and technical aspects of the therapeutic physical restraint of children.
 

The Fatality Review Panel wishes to note publicly that it received complete cooperation in its investigation from the DCF, the DPH, the DSS, the Department of Mental Retardation (DMR), the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS), the Judicial Department, and private individuals and entities (including the Facility’s administrators and its employees) involved with Andrew M. and his family. The Panel is most appreciative of this cooperation.

After intake of the above-described body of material, and after extended discussions with experts, and extensive testimony, the Panel members shared their findings with one another and drafted this report. The review, the findings, and the recommendations are the gravamen of this public document. The names of specific individuals, specific service providers, private agencies and hospitals have been omitted from this report for reasons of confidentiality. It is not the intent of the Fatality Review Panel or the Office of the Child Advocate to assess guilt or find negligence by or of any individual, institution or agency. It was the Panel's strong sense that the focus of its investigation should be on Andrew, his involvement with state agencies, and on the systemic issues raised by this child’s tragic death.

Since recollections and memories are not completely reliable, the facts as set forth below represent the Panel’s best efforts at piecing together the history of the case as a whole, as well as what happened on the day of the child’s death. Although the reliability and content of accounts and records may vary to some degree, the Panel, after a comparison of sources where possible, believes that this is a reasonably accurate account.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF FACTS

Andrew M. was born on December 6,1986, and first came to the attention of DCF (then known as the Department of Children and Youth Services) prior to his third birthday, as a result of medical neglect referrals. His family has had sporadic involvement with DCF since that time over concerns of chronic abuse as well as medical, physical and educational neglect. While in the care of his mother and grandmother, Andrew suffered three separate eye injuries resulting in the complete blinding of his left eye at the age of three.

At the time of his admission into the Facility, Andrew was eleven years old and had experienced three changes in his legal guardianship, a host of serious injuries and illnesses, a period of commitment and extensions of commitment to DCF, repeated inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations, placement in three traditional foster homes, placement in one therapeutic foster home, a day treatment program, and partial hospitalization programs. Andrew was a child described by many as "sweet" and "endearing," who was eager to please and wanted to learn to read. He was also a child who had an extensive history of acting out, sometimes violently, and of planning harm to others, of acting on those plans on at least one occasion, of threatening suicide, of having to be physically restrained in school and in psychiatric facilities (on at least twelve and four occasions respectively), and of running away. He had been diagnosed on several occasions with "oppositional defiant disorder," "conduct disorder: and "intermittent explosive disorder," disorders in which strongly imposed authority is frequently met with aggressive behavior and uncontrollable rage.

On March, 19, 1998, Andrew was admitted to the Facility under a Physician’s Emergency Certificate (PEC) from Hospital A, after he exhibited threatening behaviors against another child in Foster Home A. At the Facility, Andrew was examined by a psychiatrist and admitted to the inpatient program on the S Unit. A staff therapist was assigned to Andrew's case, and he began to gather background information on Andrew. The therapist worked with Andrew two times in group therapy, but had not engaged in individual therapy with Andrew up to the time of his death.

On the morning of Sunday, March 22, 1998, Andrew became involved in a series of escalating exchanges with Mental Health Worker 1 (MHW 1) which led to Andrew’s removal to the time-out room. Once in the time-out room, another series of escalating confrontations took place leading to Andrew being placed in a physical restraint by MHW 1, who was then assisted by MHW 2. This physical intervention resulted in Andrew’s untimely death.

The Chief Medical Examiner has ruled that the cause of Andrew's death was traumatic asphyxia, resulting from compression of the chest due to the weight of an adult individual applied during a so-called "therapeutic restraint hold." The manner of death has been ruled accidental. The police investigation is continuing. The DCF and DPH investigations are reportedly complete but have not yet been released to the public.

DISCUSSION OF ISSUES

Behavior Management and Therapeutic Intervention

The primary focus of this report is to assess the events that occurred surrounding the death of Andrew by looking at the policies and procedures relative to behavior management and therapeutic intervention in place during his time at the Facility in order to determine whether those elements played a part in his death. A retrospective view of the events in this case allowed the Panel to form conclusions which are the basis for its recommendations.

Background Information

On March 17, 1998, Foster Mother A informed DCF Social Worker A that she had learned that, three weeks prior, Andrew had put cleaning disinfectant on his younger foster brother's toothbrush because he "wanted him dead." On March 19, 1998, Andrew informed his mother by telephone that he was going to kill that same foster brother. Concerned, Andrew's mother immediately informed the foster family and Andrew was taken by Foster Mother A to Hospital A. A physician at Hospital A signed a Physician's Emergency Certificate (PEC) based on "dangerous behaviors," authorizing Andrew's immediate involuntary admission for inpatient psychiatric care. Because there were no beds available at Hospital A, Andrew was transported by ambulance to the Facility, which is owned by Hospital A.

The facility is a psychiatric hospital for children and adults with branch programs around the state. Its purpose is to provide the highest level of care to individuals with psychiatric and chemical dependency problems. There are two adult units and two children's units at the main campus. The children's units are known as the P Unit and the S Unit. There are a total of fifty-four beds available in these two units. The P Unit generally serves the adolescent population, ages 13-18, and has thirty beds available. The S Unit serves children between the ages of 5 and 12 and has twenty-four beds. When the S Unit is full to capacity, children may be admitted to the S Unit, but be assigned rooms on the P Unit.

The facility primarily serves a population of children who exhibit depression or behavior that is harmful to themselves or others, who have been diagnosed as psychotic, who have been sexually abused, or who exhibit conduct disorders. The average length of stay for children at this Facility is approximately eight days unless there is a problem with transition to another placement. Over 80% of the population on the children's units are children involved with DCF, who are receiving Title XIX benefits.

The time-out room where the incident occurred is roughly triangular, measures ten feet and twelve feet at its greatest dimensions and, at the time of Andrew’s death, was covered on the walls and floors with blue foam padding, approximately three inches thick. Prior to Andrew's death, there was no lock on the door to this room. There is a round outside skylight in the ceiling, and a small window in the door. There is a mirror positioned in the room to allow for observation of any part of the room by someone sitting outside the room. The time-out room is used in this unit for circumstances ranging from children voluntarily taking breaks from stressful situations, to children being involuntarily restrained and secluded.

On the day of Andrew's death, the S Unit was staffed by five nursing personnel (four mental health workers and one nurse), some of whom were full-time and some part-time staff. On weekends, a nursing supervisor oversees both the children's units and the adult units at this facility and was supervising on the weekend of Andrew’s death. On the day of Andrew's death, there were 26 children on the S Unit, with two of those housed on the P Unit.

On that Sunday, both Nurse 1, who was responsible for the S Unit, and Nurse 2, the supervisor, were weekend staff; accordingly, they each had only one day’s experience with Andrew prior to the incident. MHW 1 is a part-time employee who principally works on an adult unit. He had no prior experience with Andrew at all. In general, mental health workers who "float" to S Unit are not given direct patient care duties. However, MHW 1 had spent a great deal of time on S Unit in the preceding months and was regarded as "one of the staff." He had not been specifically assigned to Andrew, and therefore he had not reviewed his chart.

Mental health workers at the Facility must have a minimum of three years of college education in a related field, three years of experience in a related field or an associate's degree in a related field, combined with one year of related experience. Nurses at the facility are required to be Registered Nurses.

At least one physician is available in the Facility at all times. On the day of the incident, the sole physician who was present was a psychiatrist. Clinical staff, which consists of psychologists and social workers, are available during weekend days, but were not present on S Unit when the incident occurred.

Staff training for mental health workers at the Facility consists of a two week orientation at the start of employment, followed by a six week probationary period during which the employee gets a "multitude of different levels of training." There are also required expectations for individuals in certain areas with some mandatory in-service training in subjects such as growth and development, infection control, fire and safety, and protective intervention techniques. There are also requirements for the amount of in-service training that needs to be accomplished on an annual basis. If an employee is assigned to the children’s unit, there is more focused training on children. Individuals who are only occasionally assigned to the children’s units do not get the same degree of training on children’s issues as the regularly-assigned staff. MHW 1 had received three of the four development training modules available.

Review of the Interactions Leading to Andrew’s Restraint and Death

On March 21, 1998, the evening before the incident, Andrew got into an argument with another child while they were playing in the gym. He was given a choice of consequences and chose to go quietly to his room. Although assigned to the S Unit, Andrew slept on the P Unit because of a lack of beds. The morning of March 22, 1998 was Andrew's fourth morning at the facility.

On weekends, breakfast is brought to the unit and the children get their trays and sit at tables to eat the meal. Andrew was brought to the S Unit at 7:30 a.m. Presumably, he had awakened earlier and had probably already had been through a morning routine of washing and getting dressed on the P Unit. When he arrived at the S Unit he was "not talking but he didn't seem upset." Unlike the other children on the unit, Andrew had no room in which to wait for the staff to begin the weekend morning program.

Consequently, it is possible that he felt more like an outsider than the other children who actually slept on the unit. Andrew was asked to rearrange some furniture on the unit, "which he did with no problem." Then, he watched television until MHW 2 called him and two other boys to breakfast first "as a reward for being quiet."

After getting his food, Andrew sat down next to another child. MHW 1 circulated around the room making conversation with the children. He then sat at Andrew’s table and made some attempts to engage the children in conversation but Andrew ignored him and "kept staring at his bowl". MHW 1, receiving no response, interpreted Andrew's silence to his conversational approaches and questions as hostile and challenging. The child next to Andrew then told MHW 1 about the incident in the gym the previous night. Andrew’s response was to put his open hand in front of the other child's face and punch it with his fist. MHW 1 conveyed to Andrew that such a gesture was inappropriate, and Andrew responded that the other child should "stay out of his business". MHW 1 felt that Andrew was angry and, wishing to avoid a physical altercation between the children, asked Andrew to move to another table. When Andrew refused to move, he was ordered to move while MHW 1 counted to three. Andrew again refused and, after another verbal exchange, Andrew then stood up and MHW 1 held his right wrist and right elbow and employed an "escort hold" to take him to the time-out room. There are conflicting reports regarding whether or not Andrew struggled on the way to the time-out room, or whether he appeared angry at that point.

Once in the time-out room, Andrew was told that he needed to remove his shoes, a standard policy at this facility when a child is in the time-out room. He kicked off first one shoe and then the other, each of which hit the opposite wall, narrowly missing MHW 1. When ordered to move from the left wall to the right corner, a command which was based not on policy but rather on practice at the Facility, Andrew refused. At this point, MHW 1 told Andrew that he would count to three while Andrew complied with the order. When Andrew failed to comply, MHW 1 approached Andrew again and applied the same type of escort hold as used previously. Andrew erupted into an angry outburst and began to struggle violently with MHW 1.

MHW 1 put Andrew's right arm down to the front of Andrew’s waist and, as he was attempting to grab Andrew's left arm, MHW 2 came into the room. She had been on the telephone for less than ten minutes and hurried to the room when she heard a scream. On her way to the time-out room, she passed Nurse 1 who was eating cereal at the staff table and who appeared not to hear the sounds coming from the room, although she was only footsteps away. MHW 1 got Andrew's left arm down to his waist and was behind Andrew in an effort to do a "one-man takedown." MHW 2 grabbed Andrew's legs and MHW 1 went down to his knees. Then, all three went to the floor with Andrew positioned on his right side, with his arms crossed in front of him, underneath his body. MHW 1 extended his own body over Andrew applying pressure with his chest on Andrew’s left side. MHW 2 crossed Andrew’s ankles and held down his legs. Andrew continued to scream and struggle for the next several minutes, saying "Get off! Get off!" About a minute into the hold, Andrew expelled gas. Approximately two to three minutes after MHW 2 had entered the room, Nurse 1 came in and observed the scene, noting that Andrew’s face was turned toward the door and away from the two people who were restraining him. She stated that she would check on Andrew's medications to see if a p.r.n. (as needed) medication was ordered for chemical purposes, and left the room. MHW 1 and 2 attempted to calm Andrew down by talking to him. Andrew's head was going back and forth from left to right and he continued to scream and struggle.

After a few more minutes, Andrew stopped screaming but continued struggling. The mental health workers thought he was starting to calm down and MHW 1 let some pressure off. The workers discussed aloud that Andrew was a "Level 3" (pursuant to the Facility's behavior system), and should not be behaving in this manner, and that he would probably be dropped down to a "Level 2." Andrew’s face was then turned so that his right cheek was on the floor. MHW 1 asked MHW 2 what Andrew needed to say to get out of the hold. MHW 2 responded that Andrew needed to "commit to safety." Andrew was asked some questions, but he did not respond. The workers continued to talk to him for one to two minutes after they smelled urine, attempts were made to rouse him and they turned him over onto his back. They observed urine on his pants, his eyes nearly closed, and his mouth was open. He did not respond to questions or commands. When they sat him up, his head flopped. MHW 2 attempted to find a pulse, was unsuccessful, and then called the nurse.

During the next few minutes, Nurse 1 attempted to find a pulse, asked for a stethoscope, checked for a heartbeat, and began mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. An ambulance from the Facility’s private service was called. Subsequently, 911 was also called. Other medical personnel including a doctor and Nurse 2, who was the nursing supervisor for the entire hospital that day, were summoned. Upon her arrival, Nurse 2 began chest compressions on Andrew. Upon the arrival of other CPR providers, Nurse 2 then coordinated the ambulance response. The ambulance arrived, and paramedics took over the emergency medical treatment, and transported Andrew to the local general hospital where he was pronounced dead.

Use of Physical Restraint

1.    Introduction
Contrary to popular belief, the use of physical restraint in caring for persons with mental illness or emotional disturbances is not an obscure topic. Indeed, an abundance of recent professional literature exists on the use of seclusion and restraint in treating children, adolescents and adults in psychiatric facilities. Numerous articles and studies about these topics have been published in the last two decades in journals devoted to psychiatry, psychology, child mental health, child welfare, developmental disabilities, education and juvenile correction. Most of the articles that are referenced reflect data and opinions about the psychiatric care of children and adolescents. However, the Panel also relied on a selection of landmark articles dealing with seclusion and restraint of adult psychiatric patients or persons with mental retardation. A bibliography may be found in Appendix D.

2.    Restraint in the context of a behavior management program 

A review of best practices indicates that physical restraint should never be used as retributive measure. It has a place as a last resort to prevent patients from injuring themselves or others. The purpose of the therapeutic program should be directed to preventing the need for physical restraint from arising; accordingly, incidents involving physical restraint should be rare. In addition to an acknowledgment that use should be infrequent, personnel who are interacting with potentially violent or suicidal children must also have adequate training to ensure that these rare events are conducted in a manner which is maximally safe for children and staff. When restraint is utilized, it should end as soon as safety of the child and others has been assured. Assuring safety does not require the child to utter a verbal formula; the staff members involved must judge the safety of the situation from the entire range of behavioral and verbal interactions which are occurring.

In some contrast to physical restraint, Miller, Walker and Friedman (1989) have described a reactive treatment technique called "therapeutic holding," which involves having three to four trained staff members contain a violent child by taking hold of the individual and forcing her or him to the floor (this is known as a "take down"). The staff members then immobilize the child’s limbs, giving "careful attention to the patient’s position and movement to avoid injury, " offer verbal reassurance and comfort, and may support the child’s head and neck with a small pillow. This technique is used until the child has calmed down. The child is then released and allowed to resume regular activities. The child is not sedated or put into seclusion.

When a child is admitted to a psychiatric institution, the psychiatric service of a general hospital or a residential facility, a physician must promptly review the pertinent medical history and conduct physical and mental status examinations. That historical review and examination will provide the initial information necessary to begin to formulate a treatment plan, including any limitations of standard practice. The process of assessment should continue with full input from the members of the team caring for that child. Every portion of the activities engaged by the child should contribute to the therapeutic plan. As the child becomes better known to the staff, strategies that work in fostering appropriate behavioral self-control should be identified and passed along from shift to shift. If a crisis situation develops which has resulted in the use of physical or mechanical restraint, the team should review the events and discuss what triggers existed and possible ways in which the situation might have been de-escalated, thereby avoiding the need for restraint and promoting the therapeutic advancement of the child.

The Facility has expressed the goal of becoming a "restraint-free institution." This goal has been achieved in several pediatric psychiatric programs cited in the pertinent literature. Irwin (1987) described an eight-bed psychiatric unit for children aged 4-11 years that never utilized seclusion and had a 2:1 child-to-staff ratio; they did occasionally use "safe, gentle holding". Masters and Devany (1992) reported on their experience in a unit for children ages 2-12 years that used physical restraint only once in twelve years; instead, the staff (at a 3:1 child-to-staff ratio) employed milieu therapy, extensive "talking down," and a graded series of time-out options, with a locked seclusion room as a last resort.

At best, the use of such restraint techniques in a proactive manner requires sufficient personnel to identify situations before they escalate and to intervene before a crisis has developed. Needless to say, these personnel will have more success if they are extensively trained in the use of these techniques and if they know the child well. The Facility had a 5.2:1 child to staff ratio on the day of the incident. MHW 1 had never seen Andrew before and the nurse in charge was also weekend staff. This ratio of children to staff appears high for a psychiatric facility that is expected to care for children who have serious degrees of emotional disturbance. It is unlikely that any program that deals with a population of emotionally disturbed children can be truly "restraint-free" with staff attention spread over a large number of children.

3. Training in de-escalation and restraint techniques

Any program committed to restraint as a rare intervention must devote considerable training time in teaching de-escalation strategies which enable a child to regain self-control. Such a program of training must involve role-playing, with the trainer demonstrating the effects of productive and counter-productive approaches to a difficult patient. The trainer must then critique responses of the trainees and hone their abilities to identify and de-escalate a situation. At least as much time should be devoted to de-escalation strategies as to teaching physical restraint techniques. Formal re-education should occur at least annually, but case-based teaching should occur much more frequently, with the program director and other clinical staff taking the lead in reviewing good and bad examples of interventions which have occurred on the unit.

Teaching of physical restraint techniques is predicated upon using a well-defined program, solidly based on current, up-to-date research which takes into account minimization of risks to both patient and staff members. It is not plausible for each institution to generate such a program on their own. There are several national programs which incorporate "train-the-trainer" as well as training courses. These programs allow the institution to develop a well-trained, externally certified cadre of trainers, who can then teach in their own setting. These trainers must update their knowledge periodically, so that their teaching continues to reflect current standards of practice, and also to prevent an evolution of individual practice in the institution which may arise without research based on a solid foundation.

The largest general program is Crisis Prevention Institute (CPI), which provides a twenty-four hour "train-the-trainer" program and a twelve-hour introductory program. This organization authorizes certification and re-certification of both trainers and providers. Another respected program is the Therapeutic Crisis Intervention (TCI) program developed at Cornell University. TCI differs from CPI in that there is more instruction in child development issues affecting de-escalation strategies. The nature of the restraints is also somewhat different. Both programs provide a consistent approach with emphasis on both de-escalation and safety. There are other programs available as well.

At the time of the incident involving Andrew, the Facility was using a training technique which was brought into the institution more than ten years ago (Protective Intervention Technique, or PIT). Since the program was obtained, all new trainers at the Facility have been trained by the existing in-house training staff. As a result, the program as used at the Facility has not changed appreciably over the years, except that some informal variations have crept into the routine practice within the Facility. There is no separate "train-the-trainer" program; new trainers observe and participate in at least three in-house training programs before they are certified, within the institutional structure, to train others. Safety considerations (including evaluation of the child during application of restraint and pitfalls for each of the restraint holds) are not emphasized. The expressed perception of at least one experienced trainer in this institution was that these techniques were safe; he was unaware of any previous injury more serious than bruises or rug burns.

Within the last several years, the Facility’s commitment to becoming a "restraint free" institution has resulted in an increased amount of training time devoted to de-escalation strategies. This has been accomplished by introducing a Management of Aggression training module and incorporating portions of this into the PIT training. Nevertheless, this still represents a small portion of the ten hours devoted to the initial training.

In fact, restraints are used frequently on these units. In the first seventy-five days of 1998, 132 incidents occurred which resulted in use of some sort of restraint, an average rate of 1.76 incidents per day. (This did represent a 33% decrease from the equivalent period in 1997 when there were 199 episodes of restraints, an average rate of 2.65 incidents per day).

The Facility began tracking mechanical restraint, such as use of a safety jacket, on the adult and adolescent units over four years ago, and they have been tracking the use of physical restraints on the pediatric unit for the past fifteen months. The intervention team is debriefed on the adult and adolescent units whenever a mechanical restraint is used; no such debriefing exists on the pediatric unit at this time.

Prior to Andrew's death, the Facility required all mental health workers to receive a yearly one-hour period of retraining in management of aggression and physical restraint. This is insufficient to afford an opportunity for staff members to practice de-escalation skills (negotiation, talking down, relaxation skills) or to correct any flaws in physical restraint technique which have developed since the time of the original training.

The Facility has indicated to the Panel that it is beginning a transition to CPI training. The "train-the-trainers" program will begin in May 1998.

4.     Dynamics of the incident leading to Andrew’s restraint

Our research reflects that most incidents of seclusion and restraint of children in psychiatric facilities occur at times when children are being asked to "shift gears" and move from one activity to another, e.g., after school, around 4:00 p.m.; at bedtime, around 9:00 p.m.; and first thing in the morning. This is the case on S Unit as well. Various authors postulate that these are times of increased staff-child interaction, accompanied by the stress of getting the children to cooperate with commands or directions from their caretakers as they move from one activity to another. It is also likely that children may act out or challenge the authority of their caretakers during periods of "downtime," times when there is no specific programming for them and they have been expected to amuse or soothe themselves. Numerous authorities have noted that incidents of violent behavior between staff members and children most often involve male staff persons and male children, particularly adolescents, at times of high staff-patient contact and low programming (Earle and Forquer 1987).

The scenario on the morning of Andrew's death is an example of the type of "downtime" that frequently is experienced by children in most institutions: hours may be spent each day waiting for an activity to begin, often with an expectation that children watch television as a way to pass the time. Unfortunately, that "downtime" often appears to be a contributing factor when children act out or have confrontations with the staff.

After Andrew made an aggressive gesture toward the other child and refused to move to another table, proper training could have supplied MHW 1 with alternatives to the measures that were employed. Unfortunately, each of MHW 1's interventions escalated the interaction in what amounted to a power struggle between him and the child. The interventions utilized with Andrew that morning contributed to a progressive escalation of aggression and counter-aggression. Rather than utilizing specialized approaches to de-escalate the situation at any one of a number of points, the responses by MHW 1 only served to escalate the situation. The Facility’s training does not provide sufficient modeling of appropriate de-escalation techniques to ensure their appropriate utilization in the incident described. Such techniques are not likely to be used unless there is adequate training and emphasis upon their utilization. It is not reasonable to expect such sophisticated interventions from psychiatric aides in the absence of intensive training and modeling by the clinical staff.

The sequence of actions taken by MHW 1 resulted in escalating rather than de-escalating aggressive behavior. Yet the techniques described in the Facility’s "Management of Aggression" training module note that reducing the number of commands issued, respecting "personal space," avoiding power struggles and remaining calm can enable the patient to assume control over his or her own behavior. These techniques are especially important in patients with conduct disorder or oppositional- defiant disorder.

Children with oppositional defiant disorder are likely to have an increased "personal space," and to become aggressive when that zone is "invaded." Their antagonism often escalates when given a direct order. They are much more responsive to a calm environment which does not encroach upon them. Close proximity at the breakfast table with the other child and an authoritative adult, coupled with the apparent alliance of that adult with the other child, were likely triggers for Andrew's actions. Alternative responses such as removing the other child from Andrew's environment (without appearing to penalize that child) could have restored Andrew's self-control. Alternatively, Andrew'could have been told, "You can start to calm down by going on your own for a time out in (an area other than the seclusion room). If you need help with this, I can help you by taking your arm and walking with you. You don’t have to apologize now if you don’t feel up to it; you can apologize after you feel calmer about this." In fact, a review of Andrew’s mental health records confirmed that he responded positively to such alternatives. Cotton (1989) makes the point that punishment within the context of appropriate discipline is an acceptable alternative as long as it is educational in nature. It follows that seclusion and physical restraint should never be imposed in a retaliatory or purely reactive fashion.

Once in the padded time-out room, with his shoes off and standing quietly against the far wall, Andrew represented little danger to himself and no danger to others. At worst, he might have injured himself by banging his head or limbs against the walls (which were padded) or against the window in the door. The apparently arbitrary command to "get into the corner," accompanied by an escort hold, escalated the situation to the point where Andrew "went ballistic" and the therapeutic restraint was initiated.

If the policy at this facility requires that children who are "going ballistic" be restrained in the time-out room, as opposed to being left alone to calm down, this policy should be re-examined. If the time-out room is not designed to minimize the potential for injury to unrestrained children of Andrew's age, the room should be re-designed for greater safety. If the policy directs or permits a single staff member to "take down" a violent child in the time-out room, this portion of the policy should be re-examined as well. In many psychiatric facilities, policy under such circumstances dictates that the staff member leave the seclusion room and call for assistance. Help should arrive in less than one minute and a violently acting out child is restrained by as many as four or five staff members. 

In order for any of the foregoing alternatives to be viable, the hospital needs to make significant changes in its policies, procedures and culture. For a psychiatric care facility to offer a true therapeutic milieu, the administration and medical staff need to model an attitude that makes the least intrusive and most educational methods of patient care a priority. Constructive change will require intensive staff training and supervision in non-confrontational methods of interacting with children. A variety of other changes probably will be necessary including lower child to staff ratios, greater availability of other management options and implementations of individualized care plans for all children seven days a week.

5.     Safety issues in the use of physical restraint

Safety issues become paramount when one or more adults are exerting physical restraint on a child. Further, even in one-on-one situations, as in this case, disparity in size between adult and child must be taken into account. In all restraint holds, a crucial element of safety involves the avoidance of chest compression leading to disability of the lungs to expand and get oxygen in to the body. Use of a prone restraint hold which permits the restrainer's weight to be placed upon the patient's chest is dangerous. This danger is magnified when the restrainer is twice the weight of the child. Under no circumstances should a staff member be allowed to lie on top of a child in order to restrain her or him.

The prone restraint hold illustrated in the Facility's PIT manual does not advocate weight across the patient's chest. Rather, the child’s arms are crossed in front with the hands below the waist. If this is performed correctly, the restrainer’s hands are situated below the waist, and the arms are not exerting pressure on the chest beneath the child. A side position restraint is also taught. In this situation, too, the hands are supposed to be low. A practice evolved at the Facility which allows the restrainer to extend his body over the child, using the trainer’s chest as a "ceiling" over the child’s body. Trainers at the Facility advised trainees to use only enough weight to maintain the hold. Small variations in this practice may lead to a restrainer lying on the top or side of the child’s back with the child’s face to the floor. As in this case, this variation may lead to a restrainer’s weifht compressing the child’s chest.

Neither the CPI nor TCI programs permit a technique like the prone PIT hold described in the Facility’s manual, or the variation which has emerged. The CPI program does not include any prone restraints. The TCI program incorporates a prone restraint which does not involve crossing the child’s arms in front. This restraint also does not allow the restrainer to put any pressure on the child’s chest or back. Neither program advocates that restraints other than escort holds be performed by one person.

It is noteworthy that the clinical staff at the Facility did not, apparently, receive training that alerted them to the possibility that a child might sustain a serious injury or even die as a result of physical restraint. In Andrew’s case, the staff interpreted his struggles and complaints behaviorally rather than medically. Whenever a child who is being restrained yells "Stop!" or "I can’t breathe!" or "That hurts!", the staff who are performing the restraint need to do something differently (release the child or change the hold or the child’s position and reassess the situation). While it is true that the child simply may be trying to escape or evade restraint and may not be experiencing significant physical distress, it is not safe to ignore the signal and assume that the child is being manipulative. Some may believe that, if the child is screaming or talking, she or he is not in respiratory distress. Unfortunately, it is possible that what the child now is screaming or saying will be the last vocalization that she or he is able to make.

There are other issues as well which may affect child safety during application of physical restraint. Many medical conditions may make one or more methods of restraint more dangerous than usual. Patients with chronic, severe cardiac or respiratory conditions are at higher risk of arrhythmia, respiratory failure, myocardial infarction or cardiac arrest. Patients with Down's Syndrome are at high risk for atlanto-occipital instability. In this condition, the head can "slip off" the spinal column, leading to a severing of the spinal cord causing death or quadriplegia. Patients with any condition that decreases bone density (e.g., osteoporosis, chronic renal failure, osteogenesis imperfecta) are at increased risk of fracture from physical restraint. Patients with bleeding disorders such as hemophilia, or who are taking anticoagulant medication, are at increased risk of severe bruising and hematoma formation resulting from physical restraint. Only a knowledgeable physician can gauge the relative risk of physical restraint of an individual child versus the risk that the child will behave in a way that will cause self-injury or harm to others. For these reasons, information regarding a child's personal medical status is vital to the treatment and planning for each individual child. There are children with certain medical conditions who are at risk of serious injury or death by even the most innocuous forms of restraint. Those conditions must be considered in determining whether any form of restraint poses a risk to the safety and well-being of the child.

The Panel's review of the record in Andrew's case indicates that he had a history of asthma dating back to 1993. While we note one brief hospitalization and two other emergency department visits for asthma in Andrew's past medical history, the hospital admission occurred four and one-half years prior to Andrew's death. There is no indication that Andrew M.'s asthma played any role in his death. The autopsy found that the cause of death was traumatic asphyxia, a condition resulting from mechanical causes.  

There was no evidence at autopsy of the pulmonary or vascular changes symptomatic of severe asthma. This information is, however, significant to our findings. While Andrew's medical condition appears to have played no part in his death, there was evidence that the Facility, despite having this child's medical history at intake, failed to consider this information in determining the appropriateness of using physical restraints on him. Furthermore, there is no indication that this information was passed down to the direct care mental health workers who provided oversight and supervision to him.

In addition, while in restraint, Andrew was initially positioned on his right side. This left his only functional eye down in contact with the padded floor of the time-out room. His ability to see MHW 1 and 2 was seriously impaired and may have contributed to his continued struggles, since they stayed on his left side throughout the entire period of his restraint.

This suggests to the Panel that differential treatment and planning is not provided at the Facility for every child who has a compromised medical condition. 

6.  Statewide policy and standards on the use of physical restraints

There are no current national or statewide standards regarding restraints or restraint programs. A review of documents including policies, procedures, operating statements, and restraint training materials from fifty-four facilities in Connecticut was conducted. The types of facilities reviewed included shelters, group homes, residential treatment centers, hospitals, the three juvenile detention centers operated by the Judicial Department, and Long Lane School. The facilities provided material ranging from a simple statement of "no physical restraint used" to policies and procedures regarding formal prevention/ intervention programs.

Individual facilities have developed their own approaches to restraint, and have incorporated these approaches into their treatment philosophies. There is considerable variation in the formality of programs throughout the state, in part due to differences in severity of behaviors, but also because of the ages and sizes of child populations. The choice of which restraint program to use is made at the facility level. Most facilities using a formal training program utilized one generated outside of their facility. However, it was not clear how often outside experts are used to refresh the in-house trainers or, in fact, how diligent in-house training efforts are.

The smaller facilities such as the shelters and group homes, which operate on the less-restrictive end of the treatment scale, generally state a policy of "no use of physical restraint." Therefore, the staff usually have no formal training in safe and appropriate physical restraint techniques. Should extreme behavior problems develop, the policy is to call 911 for police and/or paramedic assistance. Until recently, these less-restrictive facilities did not admit children deemed to require intensive treatment that their staff was not trained to provide. A repeated concern of these facilities in the materials reviewed, however, is that the new "no reject/no eject" language included in the current contract with DCF has resulted in more disturbed and/or violent children being placed by DCF in these "less-restrictive" settings. This practice has resulted in more injuries to the clients and to the staff, and increased incidents of property damage. Facilities are also reporting that DCF is not moving quickly enough to remove a child when he or she becomes a risk to him or herself or others, perhaps because of a lack of readily available specialized resources.

The use of more formal restraint training generally is used at those facilities which are designed to serve populations with more severe behavior difficulties and in the larger treatment facilities. Most programs utilize either the CPI or TCI programs. All Department of Children and Families-operated facilities and the Judicial Department's juvenile detention centers currently use CPI. Many private facilities use TCI. No placement or treatment program reviewed by this Panel, except the Facility, utilized PIT or the variation of PIT that evolved at the Facility.

The philosophy that physical restraint is to be used only as a last resort is a common theme throughout the policies and programs reviewed. In all facilities, the use of preventative interventions are incorporated, taught and emphasized to some degree. Many facilities stated that more time is spent in training on prevention and intervention techniques than on physical restraint training. Facilities also generally train their staffs that physical restraints are only to be maintained for the time needed. It was not necessarily clear from the materials how that is determined.

Only a few facilities were able to provide good data on their critical incidents, injuries to clients, and injuries to the staff. These generally were the larger facilities, which maintain this information as a requirement of outside accreditation bodies. Of those facilities that reported such data, serious injuries such as broken bones were very rare. Most injuries involved rug burns, abrasions, and mildly swollen wrists.

It appears that virtually all facilities in Connecticut with physical restraint programs use one or more types of face-down restraints. However, in many cases, full training manuals were not submitted, and it was not possible to determine how many use the specific hold that was employed on Andrew. The use of restraints or non-use of restraints throughout the state varies because of different philosophies of treatment, availability of staff, availability of funding to purchase outside training, the physical plant, and the availability of immediate response from law enforcement.

7.   Recommendations

·         The Department of Public Health and the Department of Children and Families should formulate regulations that address the development of appropriate physical restraint policies for use in the facilities they license, and for ensuring that staff is properly trained (and retrained on a yearly basis). Such regulations should include the development of policies matched to age, size, and disability characteristics of the facility's population, the training requirements for each program, the need to maintain training records, lists of approved formal training programs, lists of non-approved techniques, the requirement that an outside trainer train the facilities’ trainers, the requirement of outside recertification of trainers, and the recording of injuries to clients and staff while using restraints. Failure of a facility to comply should be deemed a regulatory violation and require a written corrective action plan. Repeated violations should result in a suspension/termination of licensing.

·         Physical restraint of children should be performed only when two or more staff persons are present  available except under extraordinary circumstances.

·         Under no circumstances should physical restraint of a child include compression of the thorax of a child by the weight of an adult.

·         All facilities need to establish a supervisory hierarchy for the behavior management program they utilize, including the restraint policy and the use of time-out or seclusion rooms, with one identified individual (preferably a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist) ultimately responsible. All programs should be integrated into the facility-wide treatment approach, and disseminated to each individual in the program.

·         Without one responsible individual, programs tend to be modified over time and unofficial policies and procedures develop. Commands like "sit in the corner" and "commit to safety" are typical of day-to-day practices that are passed on to new staff who, in turn, believe those modified procedures to be correct. The individual responsible for a facility’s behavior management program must protect the integrity of the program by allowing no changes or additions without going through a formal process. This person must also stay current in the field and update the program through a best practices approach. The goal should always be to have the program in the field match the program that is on paper, thus field reviews must be conducted often.

·         DCF should establish procedures for safety for those facilities, such as many shelters, that do not utilize physical restraint or train their staff to use it. For example, prior to admission, each child should be assessed for severity of behavior problems, and the information should be provided in written form to the facility.  Additionally, DCF should have a plan for the immediate removal of a violent child from a facility that is unable safely to manage her or him.

·         Whenever physical restraints are utilized on children in Connecticut, notification should be made, on a quarterly basis, to the Office of the Child Advocate, detailing the type of restraint used and the circumstances surrounding the need for restraint, for purposes of tracking trends in the practice.

·         Every psychiatric hospital, psychiatric unit of a general hospital and residential facility for psychiatric patients should promulgate a policy delineating its standard for use of physical restraints in patients with medical conditions or on medication which may affect their response to physical restraint. This policy should be reviewed annually and amended as necessary. Each child should be thoroughly evaluated at the outset of his or her admission and appropriate interventions should be part of the treatment plan. The admitting orders should reflect any modification of the institution’s standard physical restraint policies due to the medical condition or history of the child. Such orders should indicate the required modification and the medical condition or history leading to the modification of the physical restraint policy. These orders may be amended at any subsequent time that the child’s condition changes or more history becomes available. Such orders should be reviewed at each shift change so that responsible personnel are aware of each child’s status with regard to the use of physical restraint.

·         Any situation requiring the use of locked seclusion or physical restraint on a pediatric unit must lead to a follow-up review of the incident. Quality control should include debriefing of the intervention team after the utilization of physical restraint, tracking and reporting of events and circumstances.

Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR)

1.    Discussion

Psychiatric patients, especially pediatric psychiatric patients, are generally considered a low-risk population for cardiac arrest; nevertheless, risk exists. Psychiatric patients are frequently placed on medications which may have as a side effect an alteration in conduction patterns of the heart, causing a small but increased risk of serious rhythm disturbance. Such complications are seen with both anti-psychotic and anti-depressant medications. Psychiatric patients may also suffer from other medical conditions which may lead to cardio-respiratory arrest. Sufficient personnel should be trained in CPR to ensure its proper and timely utilization if an emergency arises. One-person CPR is rapidly exhausting and is less likely to be effective than two-person CPR.

The need for cardiopulmonary resuscitation is rare in the pediatric population.   Few medical personnel participate in such resuscitations frequently unless they practice in a pediatric intensive care unit or a large pediatric emergency department. Cardiac arrest in any age group is rare in psychiatric in-patients. In general, a deteriorating physical condition is recognized and the child is transferred to a medical institution or medical unit for treatment of the condition. The ability to maintain emergency skills such as resuscitation is difficult when those skills are not maintained and refreshed in a reasonably frequent manner.

CPR is most effective when it is initiated promptly after cardiac arrest due to a serious arrhythmia. In such a case, neither the heart nor any other vital organ has suffered oxygen deprivation at the moment when the cardiac arrest has occurred, and prompt intervention can ensure that the brain and heart are preserved from further harm. If the cardiac arrest has been precipitated by ventricular fibrillation, prompt defibrillation (within one to two minutes) is the most effective technique for resuscitation; delay in defibrillation decreases the likelihood of successful intervention. For this reason, a working defibrillator should be present on every in-patient unit or floor.

Where the cardiac arrest has been precipitated by respiratory failure, as in Andrew's case, such as traumatic asphyxia, the heart has stopped because it has suffered from oxygen deprivation; all of the other vital organs, including the brain, have been deprived of oxygen for the same interval of time. This reduces the likelihood of resuscitation even with properly performed CPR or advanced life support measures. Recognition and treatment of respiratory distress prior to cardiac arrest is far more likely to have a desirable outcome than prompt institution of CPR after cardiac arrest has occurred.

Unfortunately, the staff who attended Andrew during this critical incident failed to recognized the signs of respiratory distress and air hunger that he displayed (increasing agitation, yelling "Get off me!" and, finally, continuing to struggle after he stopped screaming). The record does not reflect that anyone checked his airway or his lips or nailbeds (to check the level of oxygenation in a dark-skinned person). All of the staff attributed his struggles and verbalizations as reflecting anger and a desire to escape from restraint. Even when he urinated on himself, it was interpreted as a hostile act, not as a sign of distress. In reality, Andrew’s urination most likely reflected a release of all his sphincters after cardiac arrest had occurred.

It is noteworthy that the Facility did not train its mental health workers in cardiopulmonary resuscitation. A secondary benefit of training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation is that it teaches people to appreciate the importance of maintaining an airway and the need for children to have oxygenated blood.

Standard resuscitation protocol calls for the emergency medical services (EMS) to be notified as soon as resuscitation has been started. In Connecticut, the most prudent way to do this is to call 911. By doing so, the caller can ensure the speediest response to the emergency, with all necessary responders being notified. This also permits automatic identification of the caller’s address in those regions with extended 911 service; such identification will further speed the emergency response.

The Facility’s policy requires 911 notification in the event of a cardiac arrest. It is unclear what went wrong in the process on March 22. Nurse 2, incorrectly believed she was speaking to the 911 operator rather than to a local ambulance company, leading to a short delay in paramedic response time.

The mental health workers who restrained Andrew were not trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and resuscitation of Andrew began only after the child was unresponsive for three to five minutes, and after the nurse checked for a pulse, asked for a stethoscope and checked for a heartbeat. While it is likely that, given the cause of Andrew's death, CPR would not have made a discernible difference in the outcome of this case, a children’s unit within a psychiatric hospital should be equipped to respond immediately in both behavioral and medical capacities.

At the time of Andrew's admission, the policy of the Facility was to train only nurses and doctors in CPR, although all direct care providers were trained in their off-campus programs. They have recently instituted a new policy of training all direct care providers in their institutions as well.

2.   Recommendations

·         At least two individuals trained in CPR (basic life support) should be present on a psychiatric inpatient unit at all times. This will require at least three to four trained individuals each shift to account for meal breaks.  This may require that some personnel other than nurses receive basic life support training.

·         In a residential facility, at least one individual trained in CPR should be present in each housing unit on each shift. Appropriate measures should be in place to ensure prompt response by other personnel trained in CPR and advanced life support techniques in the event of an emergency.

·         All personnel who provide direct care to children should receive some training in recognition of medical emergencies likely to produce cardiac arrest, and should be instructed in the appropriate measures to take to ensure a prompt response by trained personnel.

·         At least one person trained in defibrillation should be present at all times on a psychiatric unit unless other trained personnel can be available in one to two minutes. A working defibrillator should be immediately available and should be brought to the site of the resuscitation immediately, even before the arrival of the person trained in defibrillation.\

·         At least one person trained in advanced cardiac life support techniques should be available within five minutes to any psychiatric unit. Any physician or nurse in charge of medical emergencies should be certified in advanced cardiac life support and recertified every two years.

·         Any physician who will be responsible for responding to a "doctor stat" or cardiac arrest should have advanced cardiac life support training and be recertified every two years. "Mock doctor stats" should be run intermittently throughout the year, which may encourage the retention of these infrequently used skills.

·         In the event of cardio-respiratory arrest or any life-threatening emergency in a psychiatric hospital or residential facility, 911 should be called rather than a local ambulance company. This will facilitate the most rapid and appropriate response to the emergency situation.

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Children
1.    Discussion

Andrew was admitted to a psychiatric facility on a physician’s emergency certificate. State law provides that the child (as well as his or her legal guardian) must be promptly notified of a right to a hearing and the right to be represented by an attorney.

There was no evidence in our review of this case that Andrew was provided with this basic information concerning his civil rights.

Andrew was admitted to the Facility three nights before his death. Neither his assigned treatment social worker nor any other DCF employees visited him, much less informed him of his rights. Andrew’s court-appointed counsel was not notified of Andrew’s placement at a psychiatric facility until he was notified of Andrew’s death. There is no indication in the Facility records that Andrew was specifically informed of his right or that there is a practice of providing such information to children who are admitted involuntarily. Upon the Panel’s inquiry, Facility administration appeared confused about this requirement and no adult connected with this case seemed particularly aware of or concerned with this omission regarding Andrew, or for that matter, any other child admitted under similar circumstances.

The involuntary hospitalization of any individual, of any age, in a psychiatric facility is a serious infringement of his or her civil rights and should only be undertaken as a last resort when the person is clearly a danger to him or herself or others. Once that determination has been made, it is the responsibility of the hospital, through its internal procedures and the Department of Public Health, through its licensing function, to ensure that the patient is accorded the maximum opportunity to exercise his or her legal right to due process. Additionally, if the patient is a child, The Department of Children and Families is likewise responsible for insuring that the child is made aware, in age appropriate language, of the rights afforded to psychiatrically hospitalized children under state and federal law.

2.   Recommendations

·         Notification of the rights of children admitted to psychiatric facilities should be provided to each child on admission in language he or she understands, verbally and in writing. A list of these rights should also be posted prominently in areas where patients will read it. Children's attorneys should also be educated regarding the civil rights of children admitted to psychiatric facilities, so that they may better represent their clients.

·         The attorney for the child should be notified of the child’s admission to a psychiatric facility within 24 hours of that admission. If admission occurs on a weekend, notification should occur on the next business day following admission to the facility. The attorney should then ensure that the child is thoroughly aware of his or her rights.

·         DCF should incorporate, in their standard social work training, information regarding the civil rights of children admitted to psychiatric facilities, and it should be agency policy that social workers ensure their wards are aware of and not denied these rights.

·         The Department of Public Health should promulgate regulations designed to ensure that all psychiatric hospitals observe the civil rights of children admitted to their programs, and to make staff training regarding those rights a condition of licensure.

Regulation and Supervision by State Agencies

1.    Discussion

The Department of Children and Families is charged by Connecticut statutes with the planning and implementation of a "comprehensive and integrated state-wide program of services" for mentally ill and emotionally disturbed children. DCF’s responsibility is not limited to those children directly committed to its care; it extends to all children in the State of Connecticut. Additionally, DCF is charged with insuring that all children under its supervision receive adequate medical and psychiatric care. The Panel’s review of the specific facts of Andrew’s case, coupled with the information received from facilities across the state, reveals that, while DCF generally does a good job within the limits of its resources of meeting these responsibilities, there are significant areas to be addressed as this case illustrates

The Facility at which Andrew was a patient at the time of his death is a well-known psychiatric hospital which has enjoyed a good reputation throughout the state. Although DCF does not license or operate this Facility, children under the care and custody of DCF are regularly placed there for psychiatric treatment and sometimes permitted to remain there, long after acute care is necessary, while DCF searches for alternative placements. At the time of Andrew’s death, there were approximately twenty-nine other children at the Facility whose temporary custody or legal guardianship was vested in DCF.

Despite DCF’s repeated and extensive use of the Facility’s services, it had not evaluated the Facility’s behavior management policies and training practices prior to Andrew’s death. Neither had DCF promulgated regulations regarding the permissible parameters of the use of physical restraints on children, despite its statutory mandate to do so, nor had it promoted statewide behavior management policies stressing de-escalation techniques and other alternatives to restraint.

This is of particular concern to the Panel in light of the death of another child under the guardianship of DCF, Robert R. This child died under strikingly similar circumstances in a Massachusetts facility almost one year ago. His death should have warranted the kind of review and assessment that has been undertaken by the recently- appointed Commissioner of DCF in Andrew’s case. The Robert R. case should have raised a "red flag", highlighting the kinds of tragedies that can befall children when behavioral management is not monitored. The Panel is concerned that DCF’s current and appropriate focus on the safety of children in the home environment may be overshadowing the need for equally vigilant child protection policies in out-of-home placements, particularly those primarily monitored by independent agencies and service providers.

As noted previously, Andrew was blind in one eye and had a clinical history of asthma. Although neither of these conditions played an instrumental role in Andrew’s death, our review suggests that neither medical disability was considered by the Facility’s staff during this incident. DCF must take the lead in emphasizing the medical idiosyncrasies of each child under its care and the need for service providers to specifically account for those details in their treatment plans.

The Department of Public Health is similarly charged, by state law, with adopting and enforcing regulations designed to maximize the safety of the hospitalized and institutionalized children of this state, and to promote the "safe, humane and adequate care and treatment" of patients. The wealth of material received by the Panel throughout this investigation clearly indicates that the physical and mechanical restraint of children is practiced regularly at facilities across the state. DPH, to our knowledge, has not promulgated regulations or otherwise promoted the development of a statewide uniform policy of behavior management and physical restraint that is reflective of the best practices research currently available.

Additionally, the details of the medical response to Andrew’s cardiac arrest, while probably irrelevant to the final outcome, are instructive. The on-duty staff did not appear to have the training or skills necessary to efficiently respond to the medical emergency. Although the administration of the Facility indicated to the Panel members that they are addressing this issue, other treatment facilities may be similarly situated. A survey and assessment of the quality of emergency medical care available to institutionalized children across the state is necessary and long overdue.

The Panel fully recognizes that what seems self-evident in retrospect, may not have been so clear prior to Andrew’s death. However, Andrew’s death has highlighted the need for DCF and DPH to act quickly to implement safeguards that will prevent this kind of tragedy from occurring yet a third time.

2.   Recommendations

·         State agencies that provide services to children should reassess all aspects of child care in placement facilities with an eye toward identifying potentially harmful practices, such as physical discipline, administration of medication, and medical emergency training. In each such area identified, the responsible agency should form a task force that includes outside experts for the purpose of assessing the practices and formulating more child friendly policies and procedures. The Department of Children and Families’ newly formed "Best Practices Intervention Panel" on physical restraints is a good example of such a task force.

·         The Department of Children and Families, in conjunction with the provider network, should develop an ongoing professional forum for the treatment of children with mental health needs, with the long range goal of the development of treatment approaches to reduce the need for the use of physical restraint.

·         As noted previously, the Department of Children and Families should thoroughly evaluate the behavior management policies and practices at every facility in which the children for which it is responsible receive treatment, regardless of whether it specifically licenses that facility, and promulgate regulations regarding the permissible parameters of the use of physical restraint on children. The Department of Children and Families should develop strategies for insuring that all service providers incorporate full and complete details of a child’s medical history in all treatment plans, and that any requirements for alternate strategies of behavior management be thoroughly documented and disseminated to all caregivers.

·         As noted previously, the Department of Public Health should promulgate a statewide uniform policy of behavior management and physical restraint for all facilities it licenses.

APPENDICES

Appendix A
Relevant Mandates of State Agencies: Department of Children and Families

[The following are excepts from the Connecticut General Statutes. Please refer to the official statutes for the complete text.]

Connecticut General Statutes section 17a-1 et seq. sets forth the duties and responsibilities of the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families.

There are a number of statutes that apply directly to Andrew M. and his family; those that are the most relevant to this investigation are set out here.

The department shall plan, create, develop, operate or arrange for, administer and evaluate a comprehensive and integrated state-wide program of services, including preventive services, for children and youth . . . who are mentally ill, emotionally disturbed, substance abusers, delinquent, abused, neglected or uncared for, including all children and youth who are or may be committed to it by any court . . . Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 17a-3.

The commissioner . . . shall: (a) Establish or contract for the use of a variety of facilities and services for identification, evaluation, discipline, rehabilitation, aftercare, treatment and care of children and youth in need of the department's services; . . . (e) Ensure that all children under his supervision have adequate food, clothing, shelter and adequate medical, dental, psychiatric, psychological, social, religious and other services. . .Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 17a-6.

The commissioner may transfer any child or youth committed to him to any institution, hospital or facility for mentally ill children under his jurisdiction for a period not to exceed fifteen days if the need for such emergency treatment is certified by a psychiatrist licensed to practice medicine by the state. Conn. Gen. Stat. sec.17a-12(c).

No child or youth placed or treated under the direction of the Commissioner of Children and Families in any public or private facility shall be deprived of any personal, property or civil rights, except in accordance with due process of law. . . Each child or youth placed or treated under the direction of the Commissioner of Children and Families in any public or private facility shall receive humane and dignified treatment at all times, with full respect for his personal dignity and right to privacy, consistent with his treatment plan as determined by the commissioner . . .The Commissioner of Children and Families shall adopt regulations . . . to specify the following: (A) When a child or youth may be placed in restraint or seclusion or when force may be used upon a child or youth . . . Conn. Gen. Stat. sec.17a-16.

If a physician determines that a child is in need of immediate hospitalization for evaluation or treatment of a mental disorder, the child may be hospitalized under an emergency or diagnostic certificate as provided in this section for not more than fifteen days without order of any court . . . At the time of delivery of such child to such hospital, there shall be left, with the persons in charge of such hospital, a certificate, signed by a physician licensed to practice medicine or surgery in Connecticut and dated not more than three days prior to its delivery to the person in charge of the hospital. Such certificate shall state the findings of the physician and the date of personal examination of the child to be hospitalized, which shall be not more than three days prior to the date of the signature of the certificate. Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 17a-78(a).

Any child hospitalized under this section shall be examined by a physician specializing in psychiatry within twenty-four hours of admission. If such physician is of the opinion that the child does not require hospitalization for emergency evaluation or treatment of a mental disorder, such child shall be immediately discharged. The physician shall record his or her findings in a permanent record. Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 17-78(b).

If any child is hospitalized under this section, the child and the guardian of such child shall be promptly informed by the hospital that such child has the right to consult an attorney and the right to a hearing under subsection (d) of this section, and that if such a hearing is requested or an application for commitment is filed, such child has the right to be represented by counsel, and that counsel will be provided at the state's expense if the child is unable to pay for such counsel. 17a-78(c).

No child in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families shall be admitted for diagnosis or treatment except in accordance with sections 17a-76 to 17a-78, inclusive, unless (1) the commissioner requests such admission, (2) legal counsel appointed by the court in accordance with section 17a-76 agrees, in writing, to such admission, and (3) the child, if fourteen years of age or over consents to such admission.. .17a-79(b).

The Commissioner of Children and Families shall have general supervision over the welfare of children who require the care and protection of the state . . . He shall issue such regulations as he may find necessary and proper to assure the adequate care, health and safety of children under his care and general supervision. Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 17a-90.

The Commissioner of Children and Families, or any agent appointed by him, shall exercise careful supervision of each child under his guardianship or care and shall maintain such contact with the child and his foster family as is necessary to promote the child's safety and his physical, educational, moral and emotional development. The commissioner shall maintain such records and accounts as may be necessary for the proper supervision of all children under his guardianship or care. Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 17a-98.

Appendix B

Relevant Mandates of State Agencies: Department of Public Health 

[The following are excepts from the Connecticut General Statutes. Please refer to the official statutes for the complete text.]

Connecticut General Statutes section 19a-1 et seq. sets forth the duties and responsibilities of the Commissioner of the Department of Public Health. Those statutes that are the most relevant to this investigation are set out here.

There shall be, within the Department of Public Health, an Office of Injury Prevention, whose purpose shall be to coordinate and expand prevention and control activities related to intentional and unintentional injuries. The duties of said office shall include, but are not limited to, the following: . . . (2) to integrate an injury and violence prevention focus within the Department of Public Health; (3) to develop collaborative relationships with other state agencies and private and community organizations to establish programs promoting injury prevention, awareness and education to reduce automobile, motorcycle and bicycle injuries and interpersonal violence, including homicide, child abuse, youth violence, domestic violence, sexual assault and elderly abuse; . . . and (5) to develop sources of funding to establish and continue programs to promote prevention of intentional and unintentional injuries. Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 19a-4i.

. . .No person acting individually or jointly with any other person shall establish, conduct, operate or maintain an institution in this state without a license as required by this chapter. Application for such license shall be made to the Department of Public Health upon forms provided by it and shall contain such information as the department requires . . . Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 19a-491.

The Department of Public Health shall, after consultation with the appropriate public and voluntary hospital planning agencies, establish classifications of institutions. It shall, in its Public Health Code, adopt, amend, promulgate and enforce such regulations based upon reasonable standards of health, safety and comfort of patients and demonstrable need for such institutions, with respect to each classification of institutions to be licensed . . . including their special facilities, as will further the accomplishment of the purposes of said sections in promoting safe, humane and adequate care and treatment of individuals in institutions . . . Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 19a-495(a).

Appendix C

Glossary of Terms
Body Bag: A large piece of reinforced cloth or canvas that can be wrapped around the patient’s body and secured with straps or a zipper. Such wraps usually are applied when the individual is lying down with arms positioned at the sides. Another name for this device is a safety coat. Physical restraint usually is required to place the patient into this device.

Carry Hold: A method of holding and transporting an uncooperative or resistant patient who is unable or unwilling to walk to another location. Carry holds usually require multiple staff persons, depending on the size, strength and degree of resistance offered by the patient.

Chemical Restraint: Sometimes referred to as a psychopharmacological restraint, this is a sedative or tranquilizing drug that may be injected into a patient who is agitated or violent. Such medication may be ordered on a "prn" or "as needed" basis. Often it is necessary to apply a physical restraint prior to administering a chemical restraint.

Consequence: This term is used by staff members to describe to a patient a positive or negative outcome that will take place as a result of the patient’s behavior. A positive consequence may be a reward (getting breakfast first, for example) or earning points that can be used to gain a desired privilege (being permitted to stay up later than the other children or receiving a pass for a home visit). Negative consequences might include losing privileges, losing points or receiving some type of punishment.

Contingency: (see consequence).

Four-Point Restraint: A method of securing a patient’s wrists and ankles (hence the "four-point" designation), usually using padded leather straps, to immobilize the limbs. This method most often is used to secure the patient in a supine (face up) position on a bed.

Escort Hold: A method of holding a patient who needs some physical control to induce her or him to walk to another location.

Manual Restraint: Holding the limbs to control and limit the behavior of an agitated, out-of-control or violent patient.

Mechanical Restraint: A mechanical device, such as a strait jacket, body bag or padded leather straps used to immobilize the patient.

Physical Restraint: The process of partially or completely immobilizing a patient by holding on to her or his limbs (manual restraint) or using a device or appliance to immobilize the patient (mechanical restraint). Although some psychiatric facilities refer to physical restraint as "therapeutic holds", the terms are not interchangeable (see below for a definition of therapeutic holding.

Safety Coat: See body bag (above).

Seclusion: A method of isolating a patient from other patients and staff by causing her or him to be placed alone in a room and not permitting her or him to leave at will. Patients usually are escorted or carried to seclusion rooms by the staff. When seclusion is described in the professional literature, it always denotes an involuntary process, unlike time out, which may be a voluntary option offered to a child (see below). Although policies usually state that seclusion is to be used only when patients are a danger to themselves or others, this intervention is likely to be perceived by patients as a form of retaliatory punishment.

Takedown: A method of overpowering an agitated or violent patient by holding on to her or his limbs and applying pressure to force the individual to the ground.

Talking Down: A process of calming a patient who is agitated by talking quietly to her or him in an undisturbed and non-confronting manner and minimizing or de-escalating anger and conflict.

Therapeutic Holding: An intervention more commonly used with children or younger (and smaller) adolescents that involves 3-4 staff persons holding, immobilizing and talking to an agitated or out-of-control child until she or he becomes calm. In this method, the staff release the patient after she or he has calmed down and the daily program is resumed. Some institutions call any form of manual restraint a therapeutic hold. By definition, however, therapeutic holding is an intervention designed to contain a patient’s behavior and then return him or her to ordinary activities, and not a prelude to a more restrictive intervention (chemical or mechanical restraint or placement in seclusion).

Time Out: This method involves interrupting a patient’s current behavior by inducing her or him to leave the group or current activity, usually for a brief period. A time out might involve asking the child to sit in a chair in the same room but apart from the group or activity; or go to her or his room or to a seclusion room, usually with the door left open or, if closed, with the door unlocked. Taking a voluntary time out as described by Cotton (1989, 1995) is a less intrusive way of managing a patient’s behavior, because the child is offered a method of regaining control by herself or himself that is non-punitive and does not involve verbal or physical confrontation with the staff. Some psychiatric facilities use the terms time out and seclusion synonymously.

Appendix D
DSM-IV Definitions
Diagnostic Criteria for Oppositional - Defiant Disorder 

A.  Pattern of negativistic, hostile, and defiant behavior lasting at least 6 months, during which four (or more) of the following are present:

    (1)  often loses temper

(2)  often argues with adults

(3)  often actively defies or refuses to comply with adults’ requests or rules

(4)  often deliverately annoys people

(5)  often blames others for his or her mistakes or behavior

(6)  is often touch or easily annoyed by others

(7) is often angry and resentful

(8) is often spiteful or vindictive

Note: Consider a criterion met only if the behavior occurs more frequently than is typically observed in individuals of comparable age and developmental level. 

B.  The disturbance in behavior causes clinically significant impairment in social, academic or occupational functioning.

C.  The behaviors do not occur exclusively during the course of a Psychotic or Mood Disorder

D.  Criteria are not met for Conduct Disorder, and, if the individual is age 18 years or older, criteria are not met for Antisocial Personality Disorder

Diagnostic Criteria for the Diagnosis of Conduct Disorder 

A.   Repetitive and persistent pattern of behavior in which the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are violated, as manifested by the presence of three (or more) of the following criteria in the past 12 months, with at least one criterion present in the past 6 months.

      Aggression to people and animals

      (1)   often bullies, threatens, or intimidates others

(2)   often initiates physical fights

(3)   has used a weapon that can cause serious physical harm to others

(4)   has been physically cruel to people

(5)   has been physically cruel to animals

(6)   has stolen while confronting a victim

(7)   has forced someone into sexual activity

     Destruction of property

      8)   has deliberately engaged in fire setting with the intention of causing serious damage

(9)   has deliberately destroyed others’ property (other than by fire setting)

      Deceitfulness or theft

(10)  has broken into someone else’s house, building or car

(11)  often lies to obtain goods or favors or to avoid obligations

(12)  has stolen items of nontrivial value without confronting a victim

      Serious violations of rules

 13)  often stays out at night despite parental prohibitions, beginning  before age 13 years

(14)  has run away from home overnight at least twice while living in  parental or parental surrogate home (or once without returning for a  lengthy period)

(15)  is often truant from school, beginning before age 13 years

B.  The disturbance in behavior causes clinically significant impairment in social, academic, or occupational functioning.

C.  If the individual is age 18 years or older, criteria are not met for Antisocial Personality Disorder

Diagnostic Criteria for Intermittent Explosive Disorder

A.  Several discrete episodes of failure to resist aggressive impulses that result in serious assaultive acts or destruction of property.

B.  The degree of aggressiveness expressed during the episodes is grossly out of proportion to any precipitating psychosocial stressors

C.  The aggressive episodes are not better accounted for by another mental disorder (e.g. Antisocial Personality Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, a Psychotic Disorder, A Manic Episode, Conduct Disorder or Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder) and are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g. a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g. head trauma, Alzheimer’s disease)

Appendix E

SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT OF CHILDREN IN PSYCHIATRIC CARE FACILITIES: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF RECENT PROFESSIONAL LITERATURE AND OPINIONS
By Suzanne M. Sgroi, M.D.

In 1998, seclusion and restraint are employed frequently for behavioral management purposes and to ensure the safety of children, adolescents and adults in psychiatric facilities. Seclusion involves the involuntary placement of a patient alone in a room or an area and not permitting her or him to leave at will. Physical restraint involves restricting the movements of a patient by holding on to her or his limbs (manual restraint) or by the application of some type of mechanical device such as straps, handcuffs, strait jackets, safety coats or body bags to achieve immobilization (mechanical restraint). Alternatively, chemical restraint (usually involving the injection of a tranquilizer, sedative or hypnotic medication) may be used with patients who appear to be agitated, violent or out of control. It often is necessary to use some form of restraint to compel a patient to go to a seclusion room. Also, restraining or secluding patients who are violent or present a danger to themselves or others are the primary methods used by psychiatric care facilities when less intrusive interventions fail. For these reasons, seclusion and restraint usually are discussed concomitantly in the professional literature or in training manuals.

Theoretical Bases for Seclusion

In an oft-quoted article, Gutheil (1978) can be credited with beginning the "modern" era of discussion about involuntary methods of behavior management by describing 3 theoretical bases for using seclusion as a therapeutic intervention with psychiatric patients. He suggested that seclusion can be used: to contain out-of-control behavior; to isolate the patient from interpersonal interactions with others who have become stressful and problematic; and to decrease sensory input for individuals who are suffering from a sensory overload. While endorsing its therapeutic utility, Gutheil (1978, 328) also commented that seclusion "is not inevitably benign under all circumstances or in all institutions," and cautioned that, "seclusion as an intervention represents a last resort." (1978, 327).

Prevalence of Seclusion and Restraint in Psychiatric Facilities

Since then, numerous articles and studies about seclusion and restraint have been published in journals devoted to psychiatry, psychology, child mental health, child welfare, developmental disabilities, education and juvenile correction. Soloff, Gutheil and Wexler (1985, 652) found "overwhelming empirical support" in the psychiatric literature to use seclusion and restraint "to limit the progression of disruptive behavior to actual violence", but pointed out that the decision to use these interventions should be based on sound clinical judgment. The American Psychiatric Association (1985) endorsed the use of seclusion and restraint for a wide variety of indications including, but not limited to, prevention of imminent self-harm or injury to others or damage to the environment (when other interventions were ineffective) and prevention of disruption to the treatment program.

Crenshaw and Francis (1995) conducted a national survey on rates of usage of seclusion and restraint in 101 state psychiatric hospitals in 44 states and found considerable variability among hospitals in the sample. Okin (1985, 648) also reported wide variation in the use of patient confinement in 7 state hospitals in Massachusetts that "could not be explained by patient demographic characteristics, legal status, diagnoses, or violence-related behavior preceding admission." Instead, Okin (Ibid.) concluded that "factors relating to individual hospital practices and conditions strongly influenced the use of confinement." Ray and Rappaport (1995) reported similar findings a decade later. These authors conducted a statewide survey of psychiatric settings in New York state and found dramatic variations in rates of seclusion and restraint that were "difficult to correlate with differences in the patient populations." (1995, 1032). They concluded that "such variations prevail because of the disparate clinical perspectives on the advisability of restraint and seclusion" and the "limited comparative monitoring" of these interventions in psychiatric settings (Ibid.).

After reviewing 25 published reports on physical restraint procedures used with mentally retarded adults and children, Harris (1996, 99) concluded that "there are numerous processes which contribute to the outcomes of restraint and these are poorly understood," and "both staff and clients risk injury, especially from emergency or unplanned restraint." Mitchell and Varley (1989) studied seclusion and restraint in juvenile correction facilities and cited the potential for abuse of these methods if programs are not monitored closely. In conducting a review of the psychiatric literature from 1972 to 1993, Fisher (1994, 1584) concluded that "it is nearly impossible to operate a program for severely symptomatic individuals without some form of seclusion or physical or mechanical restraint." While acknowledging that seclusion and restraint represent "effective means for preventing injury and reducing agitation", he also noted that these methods have "deleterious physical and psychological effects on patients and staff" and credited the "psychiatric consumer/survivor movement" for having emphasized the harmful effects (Ibid.). Lastly, Fisher concluded that "local nonclinical factors such as cultural biases, staff role perceptions and the attitude of the hospital administration" influence the rates of seclusion and restraint to a greater extent than demographic or clinical factors (Ibid.).

Consumer Opposition to These Methods

Despite endorsement by mental health providers and widespread usage in public and private hospitals, not everyone agrees about the appropriateness of these interventions. In 1990 and 1992, the National Institute of Mental Health invited mental health providers, consumers, family members and administrators to participate in round-table discussions on the use of involuntary treatment interventions by staff members of psychiatric care facilities. Blanch and Parrish (1990) reported that "some patients describe the experience of physical restraint....as parallel to the experience of rape or physical abuse." In describing the consensus of the round-table discussions, Blanch and Parrish (1992) said that participants had agreed that seclusion and restraint should not be viewed as treatment, reporting that "clients practically always experience involuntary seclusion and restraint as aversive." In presenting the perspective of an "ex-patient", Chamberlin (1985) described seclusion as "a gentle euphemism for an extremely degrading practice, which, in prisons, is referred to far more accurately as ‘solitary confinement’ ."

Studies of Seclusion and Restraint in Child Psychiatric Populations

An abundant literature also has focused solely on seclusion and restraint of children and adolescents in psychiatric care facilities. Fassler and Cotton (1992) published the results of a survey of 36 states and noted that only 6 states had regulations that addressed specifically the use of seclusion with children. These authors proposed a model policy and procedures for the use of seclusion and restraint for children and adolescents in psychiatric facility. Their policy forbade the use of seclusion and restraint as corporal punishment, for the convenience of staff or as a substitute for individualized treatment. Their guidelines suggested that medical staff designate certain staff members with documented training in seclusion and restraint as "clinically privileged" and recommended that only "clinically privileged" individuals be permitted to initiate seclusion and restraint. In this context, Fassler and Cotton (1992, 372) commented that, "The responsibility for the use and implementation of seclusion and restraint remains with the medical staff." In addition to documenting each episode of seclusion and restraint in the patient’s medical record, these authors recommended that child psychiatric units should maintain a separate log documenting all episodes of seclusion and restraint for monitoring purposes with monthly reviews and "sign-offs" by unit directors.

Efficacy of These Interventions

Garrison et. al. (1990) reported on a one-year study involving a total of 99 child and adolescent patients who were responsible for a total of 887 reportable aggressive incidents in a single child psychiatric inpatient unit. These authors reported that the staff responded to aggressive incidents with counter-aggressive strategies which included the imposition of seclusion, activity restriction, physical and chemical restraints. Male children, especially under age 11 years, displayed more incidents of physical and verbal aggression and were more likely to attack male staff persons than they were likely to attack their peers. In this study, older children were more likely to be placed in mechanical restraints when they displayed aggressive behavior. On average, children in this study were likely to be left in mechanical restraints for longer periods of time than they were likely to remain in seclusion. In an earlier study, Garrison (1984) found that, although male children were responsible for most of the reported incidents of aggression, staff members were more likely to place younger children (both males and females) in seclusion as a response. The conclusions reached by Garrison and associates (1990, 242) were that "(1) Much patient aggression within confined clinical contexts conforms to patterns of prediction directly related to person and environmental variables, and (2) The primary value of counteraggression strategies such as seclusion and restraint resides in the acute management of aggressive children and not in long-term therapeutic functions." Put differently, these authors found that factors such as patient gender, staff gender, time of day and type of activity could be used to predict the occurrence of aggressive behavior by patients and counteraggressive (intrusive) responses by the staff. Although effective as short-term responses to behavioral problems, Garrison et. al. asserted that such methods could not be shown to have significant long-term therapeutic efficacy to treat the aggressive behaviors that, frequently, are the reason for admitting children and adolescents to psychiatric care facilities in the first place.

Characteristics of Children Who Are Likely to Be Secluded or Restrained

Earle and Forquer (1995) examined reports of placement of children in a locked seclusion room over a period of one month in each of 3 public psychiatric facilities. They found that gender, ethnicity and legal status did not differentiate which children were likely to be secluded. However, older children with mental retardation/developmental disability diagnoses or non-substance abuse-related organic disorders accounted for the majority of the episodes of seclusion. These children also tended to have longer lengths of stay in the facilities than children who had fewer or no episodes of seclusion. The average duration of seclusion in this study was one hour and 24 minutes. Earle and Forquer also noted that direct-care staff were more likely to place children in seclusion during periods of the day when there was high staff-child interaction but little programming (that is, times when children were expected to amuse themselves or to get ready for an activity such as preparing to go to bed).

Tsemberis and Sullivan (1988) also found that the longer the stay for children on a latency age child psychiatric unit, the more likely they were to be restrained, either in response to agitation or violent behavior. These authors noted that children who were secluded spent much shorter periods in the seclusion room (average 18 minutes) than children who were placed in a strait-jacket (average 90 minutes). In a study of 102 children admitted to an inpatient child psychiatric unit, Millstein and Cotton (1990, 256) found that "frequently secluded children were significantly more likely to have a history of physical abuse, neurological impairment, relatively weaker verbal ability, assaultive behavior and a suicide attempt in the 6 months prior to admission." These authors noted that children who were more frequently secluded in this study appeared to need more environmental structure, had less ability to meet their own needs successfully and displayed more active and rigid, albeit unsuccessful efforts to attempt to meet personal needs. In this study, the average duration of seclusion of children was 15 minutes (comparable to the duration in the study by Tsemberis and Sullivan (1988) cited above. Millstein and Cotton interpreted their findings as indicating that "seclusion may meet specific needs for children and may not always be an indicator of inadequate policies and programs" (Ibid.).

Therapeutic Holding

Some authors have advocated the planned holding of a child to promote attachment (Cline 1979, 1992) or to treat autism (Zaslow and Breger 1969, Zaslow and Menta 1975). Bath (1994) points out that these methods differ from physical restraint in that they are proactive strategies, rather than a reaction to a child’s behavior. By contrast, Miller, Walker and Friedman (1989) described a reactive treatment technique called therapeutic holding, which involves having 3-4 trained staff members contain a violent patient by taking hold of the individual and forcing her or him to the floor (take down). The staff members then immobilize the patient’s limbs, giving "careful attention to the patient’s position and movement to avoid injury," (1989, 521) offer verbal reassurance and comfort and may support the patient’s head and neck with a small pillow. This technique is used until the child has calmed down; she or he then is released and allowed to resume regular activities. The authors reported using this hold 112 times with 40 adolescents on an inpatient psychiatric unit over an 18 month period. The average duration of the hold during their study was 21.2 minutes, although duration of holds ranged from 1-90 minutes. On this unit, therapeutic holding was used to contain out-of-control adolescents instead of using restraints or seclusion for behavioral management. The authors noted that this intervention was more frequently required for younger male patients who needed longer stays on the unit.

Although some programs use the terms therapeutic holds and physical restraint interchangeably, it should be noted that the intervention described by Miller, Walker and Friedman differs dramatically from the characteristics usually associated with manual restraint. Therapeutic holding as described by the authors involved a commitment to contain a patient’s behavior by holding her or him as for as long as necessary until the individual became calm enough to be released and return to ordinary activity. By contrast, manual restraint usually precedes another intervention, such as mechanical or chemical restraint or placement in seclusion.

Arguments for and against the Use of Seclusion and Restraint of Children in Psychiatric Care Facilities

Cotton (1989, 1995) has argued persuasively that the use of seclusion and restraint with children in psychiatric facilities is supported by a developmental rationale: that is, since it is normative for children to learn to control their own affects and behaviors, using seclusion and/or physical restraint on the far end of a continuum of therapeutic interventions can be justified. As the co-author of a model policy and procedures for seclusion of children in psychiatric care (Fassler and Cotton 1992), she advocated humane treatment and careful monitoring whenever these interventions were used with patients. Cotton (1989) also made a distinction between the use of seclusion (and restraint) as retaliatory punishment versus as supportive control techniques. She also has emphasized (Cotton 1995) that seclusion and restraint should be viewed as last-resort interventions within a therapeutic milieu that has the educational and empowering goals of helping emotionally disturbed children to learn to control themselves, rather than requiring external controls. Less restrictive alternatives to be tried first include verbal de-escalation, re-direction, and offering children the option of taking a graded series of less restrictive time outs (moving to one’s room with the door open or with the door shut, going to the seclusion room with the door left open or with the door shut but unlocked). In addition to being educational within a developmental perspective, Cotton (1989, 449) maintained that, to be therapeutic, seclusion and restraint must be "defined in formalized policies and procedures; conducted in a consistent manner; used for predictable reasons; used for reasons that are clinically indicated; used for reasons that are explained to the child before and after (their) use; used by well-trained, professionally and humanistically oriented staff; supervised and monitored by professionally trained staff and implemented in a safe, attractive and soothing place."

Masters and Devany (1992) also endorsed the therapeutic value of using seclusion in treating out-of-control children on a psychiatric inpatient service. These authors reported on a program for children 2-12 years of age that did not use physical restraint, employing instead a graded series of time-outs with seclusion in a locked room as a last resort. This program was described as having well-trained child care staff with a child:staff ratio of 3:1. By contrast, Irwin (1987) decried the use of seclusion and described an inpatient child psychiatric program for children ages 4-13 in which seclusion never was used. Instead, this program utilized "the standard repertoire of milieu therapy, such as processing, negotiating, avoidance of power struggles, slow-down periods, talking a child down, relaxation techniques, self-soothing skills and alternate coping and stress-reducing strategies and gentle, safe holding, when necessary" (1987, 125). It is noteworthy that this program had a child:staff ratio of 2:1 on weekday and evening shifts. Irwin commented that the absence of seclusion as an alternative forced the staff to use other strategies to resolve crises and manage the behavior of the children in their care.

Long-term Therapeutic Versus Short-Term Management Effects

The long term-therapeutic benefit of using seclusion and restraint to treat children in psychiatric facilities has been challenged in three recent studies. The findings of Garrison et. al. (1990) were described earlier (see above section on Efficacy of These Interventions). Measham (1995) reviewed 30 studies of the acute management of behavioral emergencies in psychiatric settings. These studies discussed the use of seclusion and physical and chemical restraints. Measham (1995, 330) concluded that, "There is little evidence for the effectiveness of most presently used acute management techniques in containing aggressive child behaviors over the long term."

Goren, Singh and Best (1993) studied the use of these intervention methods in a public child psychiatric hospital over a 3-year period. They found that 28% of the patients had been secluded or restrained a total of 1670 times. Of these, 25% were secluded more than 5 times during their hospitalizations and 32% had been placed in restraints more than once. These authors commented that "the culture of psychiatric hospitals encourages coercive staff behavior, including repeated seclusion of children whose continued aggression implies that seclusion is not an effective intervention." Goren, Singh and Best (1993, 61) further observed that the "high rates of use of seclusion and restraint suggest that these methods for controlling the behavior of children and adolescents in psychiatric hospitals may not have been therapeutic." They also suggested that "staff in such hospitals engage in a pattern of behavior characterized by an aggression-coercion cycle, in which increasingly aggressive and coercive behaviors are exhibited by both patients and staff." (Ibid. ) Put differently, these authors suggested that the methods currently used by staff of child psychiatric facilities to deal with aggressive behavior in children may tend to escalate, rather than reduce the aggression and require increasingly more coercive methods to control patients’ behavior.

Conclusion

The professional literature offers a range of opinions and practices about the use of seclusion and restraint to manage the behavior of children, adolescents and adults in psychiatric care facilities. Since 1990, there have been an increasing number of concerns raised about the long-term therapeutic efficacy of these interventions and the possibility of deleterious effects, especially when there is an absence of careful monitoring and adherence to safe and humane policies and procedures. Programs that do not use seclusion usually do use physical restraint and vice versa. It is apparent that many programs use seclusion and restraint without questioning the advisability of these interventions and without training staff to use less intrusive techniques to manage children’s behavior. In general, few programs have been described that focus on helping child psychiatric patients to learn to manage their own behaviors. These factors make it unsurprising that children in psychiatric facilities frequently are restrained or secluded in retaliation for out-of-control or aggressive behavior.

NOTE: The literature search turned up only one reference to the potential for serious injury to patients who are being physically restrained. In a letter, Fidone (1988, 203) cautioned that mentally retarded patients might experience apnea, hypotension or cardiac arrest if they continue to struggle during a "basket hold." These complications were attributed to the inability of some persons with mental retardation to communicate physical distress. Otherwise, the only references to injuries from physical restraint involved concerns about bruises or abrasions. In regard to seclusion, Masters and Devany (1992) reported that they had seen adolescents with broken metacarpal bones (presumably from banging on hard surfaces).

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REFERRALS: CAICA is not a referral agency. CAICA does not refer to or promote facilities or transport companies for children or teens. CAICA warns parents that the parent pay / parent choice programs ie. Residential Treatment Centers, Therapeutic Boarding Schools, Behavior Modification Programs, Christian Programs, Positive Peer Culture Programs, etc., are not regulated by the Federal Government and that it is a "Buyer Beware" industry. CAICA provides the following for parents: Message to Parents, Help for Distraught and Desperate Parents, and Questions to Ask and Warning Signs.

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